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Abstract 
 
This article examines the appropriateness of applying civil limitation laws to 
adult civil law claims in historical childhood abuse cases, focusing on issues 
of legal policy attending the use of such laws highlighted in the Australian 
case of Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor. It is argued that 
civil limitation laws are inappropriate when applied to such cases and that 
ultimately such laws often give primacy to the interests of alleged 
wrongdoers and to the need to protect alleged wrongdoers from civil law 
redress in a context in which the ordinary justification for such laws is weak 
when weighed against the enormity of the injury caused by the abuses 
complained of and the acute difficulties victims often face in pursuing timely 
enforcement action in respect of the childhood rights allegedly violated. The 
article also contains a review of recent developments in the law in several 
jurisdictions. 
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1 Introduction  
 
In the recent past – in a variety of jurisdictions as geographically removed 
from one another as Scotland and Queensland, Australia1 – numerous civil 
law claims brought by adults in relation to allegations of historical abuse in 
childhood2 have been stopped in their tracks by the operation of civil 
limitation laws. These cases have afforded an opportunity to examine not 
only the policy objectives underlying civil limitation laws, and the moral basis 
of those laws, but the specific legal grounds for the rejection of individual 
claims where limitation laws are applied in the context of relevant claims. 
Civil limitation laws operate to confer immunity from civil proceedings. 
Inevitably, this raises the question whether, and the extent to which, the 
law, having conferred rights – for example, a right to compensation for 
personal injury – should at the same time create immunity from the 
enforcement of the same rights, such as where civil proceedings are barred 
                                                          
1 For an examination of the impact of civil limitation laws on claims arising from allegations of historical 
childhood abuse under Australian law generally, see B Mathews ‘Limitation Periods and Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases: Law, Psychology, Time and Justice’ (2003) 11 Torts Law Journal 218. See also Mathews 
‘Judicial Considerations of Reasonable Conduct by Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse’ (2004) 27 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 631. See also L Hoyano and C Keenan Child Abuse: Law 
and Policy Across Boundaries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). And see also, generally, J 
Conaghan ‘Tort Litigation in the Context of Intra‐Familial Abuse’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 132. 
2 See The Scottish Government Scottish Government Consultation on the Removal of the 3 Year 
Limitation Period from Civil Actions for Damages for Personal Injury for in Care Survivors of Historical 
Child Abuse (Edinburgh: 2015) available at http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/06/5970/6 
(accessed 18 July 2017). In chapter 6, paras 6.7 and 6.8, the following useful outline of the scope of 
child abuse is provided: ‘[T]he National Guidance for Child Protection in Scotland which was published 
in 2010 and refreshed in 2014, set out the view that child abuse and child neglect are “forms of 
maltreatment of a child. Somebody may abuse or neglect a child by inflicting, or by failing to act to 
prevent, significant harm to the child”. The guidance goes on to provide a description of the type of 
actions that would fall under the headings: physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse and neglect. 
… The terms of reference which have been agreed for the National Inquiry on Historical Child Abuse 
defines abuse as “physical abuse (including medical experimentation); sexual abuse; emotional abuse; 
psychological abuse, unacceptable practices and neglect”’. 
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after the passage of a defined period of time.3 This question has a special 
resonance and immediacy when considering the steps recently taken in the 
UK by the Scottish Parliament to remove from the scope of civil limitation 
laws claims centring upon allegations of abuse in childhood.4 Not only is that 
a significant development in terms of how it reflects evolving public 
attitudes towards the handling of such claims, but it hints at the presence of 
a wider debate enquiring into the appropriateness of applying civil limitation 
laws to that type of claim, and looking to the possibility of developing other 
responses to childhood abuse, whether historical or otherwise. The fact that 
currently there are two statutory enquiries underway in the UK with a remit 
to investigate historical childhood abuse also serves to draw attention to the 
wider context in which childhood abuse is now being viewed and responded 
to at governmental level.5 The recent developments (particularly in 
Scotland) have also highlighted a ‘disconnect’ between judicial decision‐
making in childhood abuse civil limitation cases (as the case law had been 
                                                          
3 Some may view the conferment of legal immunity as a legal right to commit a legal wrong; though 
that arguably distorts (or at least overstates) the position, drawing attention to the need to distinguish 
carefully between substantive law and adjective law. See OJ Herstein ‘A Legal Right to do Legal Wrong’ 
(2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21. Herstein refers to diplomatic immunity as an example of 
a legal right to do legal wrong. Now while it may seem that a legal immunity, such as diplomatic 
immunity, confers a legal ‘right’ to commit a legal wrong on the basis that it can be viewed as a species 
of a generic Hohfeldian ‘right’ – like other Hohfeldian fundamental legal conceptions: eg claim‐right, 
power, privilege – diplomatic immunity laws do not directly authorise wrongdoing at the level of 
substantive rights. Arguably they are best seen as conferring a more limited adjectival right of 
exclusion from the operation of a legal power (such as, for example, a power of prosecution) which 
would, in the absence of the exclusion, enable enforcement action to be taken by police and judicial 
authorities. It would be surprising to find an immunity law that conferred a direct substantive right 
availing between two individuals (for example, akin to a Hohfeldian claim‐right or liberty right), to 
carry out an assault or a rape or a murder, or to rob a bank or drive recklessly or carelessly. 
4 See the Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 (discussed below). 
5 For the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse in England and Wales, see 
https://www.iicsa.org.uk (accessed 11 June 2018); and for the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, see 
https://www.childabuseinquiry.scot (accessed 11 June 2018). Northern Ireland’s Historical 
Institutional Abuse Inquiry closed on 30 June 2017. See https://www.hiainquiry.org (accessed 11 June 
2018). 
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developing over at least the last decade) and attitudes to childhood abuse 
generally as these had been taking shape within the same time frame in the 
public imagination and in the consciousness of the political community. 
 
In this article it is proposed to examine the appropriateness of applying 
limitation laws to civil law claims brought by adults in respect of allegations 
of historical abuse in childhood, focusing on legal policy issues – and at 
points touching upon moral considerations – attending the use of such laws. 
The idea that the law – through the conferment of legal immunity – might 
somehow be ‘protecting the wrongdoer’ (as the title of this article suggests) 
necessarily turns on a ‘one that got away’ hypothesis. Any examination of 
the use and impact of civil limitation laws must take into account the 
possibility that in some cases, where limitation laws have been successfully 
invoked in a court setting, legal protection (in the sense of immunity) will in 
consequence have been extended to individuals who – if in relevant 
circumstances civil proceedings had not actually been effectively halted 
through the operation of limitation laws – might or might not have been 
found by the court to have committed the wrongdoing alleged by the party 
pursuing the relevant proceedings. It is the possibility that at least some 
actual wrongdoers – absent a determination of wrongdoing by a court – 
might walk away ‘with impunity’ from the judicial process that gives rise to 
perhaps the most pressing moral and legal policy issues to arise in this 
context. 
 
 6 
In identifying reasons of legal policy justifying the statutory limitation of civil 
law claims, ordinarily we need look no further than the Australian case of 
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor6 (hereafter, the ‘Brisbane 
case’). Although the Brisbane case concerns a medical negligence claim, it 
has special relevance in the context of the time‐barring of adult civil actions 
founded on allegations of historical childhood abuse, given that one of the 
opinions in the case – that of McHugh J – has frequently been cited as the 
classic statement of reasons of legal policy justifying the statutory limitation 
of such actions (thereby reinforcing judicial decision‐making ordaining the 
time‐barring of those actions).7 A critical analysis of the four main rationales 
for civil limitation laws outlined by McHugh J – comprising the main 
analytical part of the discussion – follows later in this article. And towards 
the end there is a review of recent key legal developments in the UK and 
elsewhere and the possible implications of these developments (particularly 
under Scots law), looking to the future. 
 
But in setting the scene for the later analysis, it is convenient first to highlight 
some recognised harmful effects on the mature adult of (abusive) physical 
or psychological trauma suffered in childhood whilst, at the same time, 
outlining a position on childhood abuse generally, and its harmful impact, 
aimed at giving the discussion a rudimentary moral perspective. 
                                                          
6 (1996) 186 CLR 541. See, in particular, pp 551–553 (McHugh J). 
7 See for example:  B v Murray (No 2) 2005 SLT 982, especially at [22–28] (Lord Drummond Young); M 
v O'Neill 2006 SLT 823, especially at [96] (Lord Glennie); AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth 2007 SC 688, 
especially at [41–45] (Lord President Hamilton); Bowden v Poor Sisters of Nazareth and Others [2008] 
UKHL 32, especially at [5] and [23–25] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
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2 Impact of abusive experiences suffered in childhood 
 
In seeking to define the scope of certain fundamental children’s rights, Neil 
MacCormick starts with ‘a simple and barely contestable assertion’, which is 
that ‘every child has a right to be nurtured, cared for, and, if possible, loved, 
until such time as he or she is capable of caring for himself or herself’. It is 
the recognition that the denial of these basic needs would be wrong that 
leads MacCormick to assert that children have a moral right to the fulfilment 
of such needs. It is implicit in MacCormick’s position that such denial could, 
in normal circumstances, cause a child serious, and in relevant cases life‐
threatening or lasting, harm.8 It goes without saying that childhood abuse, 
in so many of its manifestations, would constitute serious violations of the 
moral rights (of children) that MacCormick takes to be self‐evident. 
 
The moral case for laws that protect children from harm rests not only on 
the self‐evident requirement for fulfilment of a child’s most basic needs, but 
on factors such as a child’s intrinsic vulnerability – and (in infancy) 
                                                          
8 DN MacCormick Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982) pp 154–155. Following John Finnis and others, I take the view that 
certain kinds of harm deemed worthy of protection by law are more readily identifiable as central 
cases of harm than as cases more obviously on the periphery, which (latter) cases could, in the result, 
fall within contestable categories of ‘harm’, such as offence or negligible harm caused to others. For 
morally compelling reasons, a variety of forms of harm to children represent central cases of harm in 
relation to which it is clearly necessary for the law to provide both criminal and civil law protection. 
As Finnis observes: ‘I prefer to call the states of affairs referred to by a theoretical concept in its focal 
meaning the central case(s).’ This enables differentiation of ‘… the mature from the undeveloped in 
human affairs, the sophisticated from the primitive, the flourishing from the corrupt, the fine 
specimen from the deviant case … but all without ignoring or banishing to another discipline the 
undeveloped, primitive, corrupt, deviant, or other … instances of the subject‐matter …’. See J Finnis 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2011) pp 10–11. 
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helplessness – relative to adults and, in some cases, to other children. Power 
imbalances in human affairs are inevitable and may not always be a bad 
thing: for instance, where a powerful state comes to the aid of a weaker 
state threatened by a hostile neighbour. Yet domination of the weak by the 
powerful is more often than not corrupting and exploitative. For children, 
the twin necessities of positive intervention (fulfilling a child’s basic needs) 
and negative constraint (eg prohibiting violations of a child’s physical, 
mental and sexual integrity) are called into play as the moral basis for 
articulating protective rights enshrined in law. But arguably, beyond those 
necessities, there are considerations arising from the more general desire to 
promote human well‐being where, ideally, a child’s physical, social, 
cognitive, educational, and emotional development is to be actively fostered 
as an end in itself.9 
 
The consequences of protective failure – especially failure at the level of 
negative constraint (for instance, the failure of law and its enforcement 
mechanisms to safeguard a child’s physical, mental and sexual integrity) – 
may be drastic and irreversible. Thus, it is widely recognised in the literature 
of human and medical sciences – including, in particular, writings in areas 
such as psychiatry, psychology and sociology – that the psychology and 
quality of life of mature adults may be detrimentally affected by abusive 
                                                          
9 The rights in question may be designed to protect everyone (eg from assault). But a range of specific 
rights of the child has been articulated in the recent past.  See in general the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and reports of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/CRCIndex.aspx (accessed 18 July 2017). See also, 
more generally, Finnis, above n 8. 
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experiences suffered in childhood. Studies examining the long‐term trauma 
caused by physical and sexual abuse experienced in childhood point to 
ongoing psychological and behavioural dysfunctionality: depression, 
anxiety, self‐destructive behaviour, substance abuse, impaired sleep 
patterns, difficulties in trusting others, feelings of isolation, stigma, and guilt, 
low self‐confidence, and the tendency to be revictimised in adulthood. One 
such study in particular has highlighted significant adult adjustment 
problems including psychological and personality disorders, relationship and 
parenting problems, occupational and health difficulties, and a generally 
diminished quality of life.10 Symptoms of childhood sexual abuse emerging 
in adulthood have included sexual maladjustment and dysphoria, impaired 
sexual self‐esteem, and abstention from sexual activity.11 What is 
noteworthy about the effects of childhood abuse is that apart from causing 
immediate injury and misery to the child victim – where the abuse may be 
as serious a contravention of criminal and civil law prohibitions as child rape, 
sexual assault, physical assault, or neglect – the recognition that the effects 
of the abuse may persist into adulthood underlines the seriousness of the 
abuse in terms of harm, and permanence of harm, caused to the victim. 
                                                          
10 See Mr Justice Ryan (principal author and Commission chairperson) Report of the Commission to 
Inquire into Child Abuse (Dublin: The Stationery Office, 2009) Vol V, at [3.30] available at 
http://www.childabusecommission.ie/rpt/pdfs/ (accessed 18 July 2017). This study informs the Ryan 
Commission’s investigation of institutional child abuse in the Irish industrial and reformatory school 
system. 
11 See in particular A Browne and D Finkelhor ‘Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of the Research’ 
(1986) 99 Psychological Bulletin 66. See also H Al‐Modallal et al ‘Impact of Physical Abuse on 
Adulthood Depressive Symptoms among Women’ (2008) 29 Issues in Mental Health Nursing 299; J 
Spataro et al ‘Impact of child sexual abuse on mental health’ (2004) 184 British Journal of Psychiatry 
416; S Bendall et al ‘Childhood Trauma and Psychotic Disorders: a Systematic, Critical Review of the 
Evidence’ (2008) 34 Schizophrenic Bulletin 568; N Rodriguez et al ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a 
Clinical Sample of Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse’ (1996) 20 Child Abuse and Neglect 943; 
F Lindberg and L Distad ‘Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorders in Women who Experienced Childhood 
Incest’ (1985) 9 Child Abuse and Neglect 329 at 332–333. 
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When an individual violates civil law prohibitions only to (later) take 
advantage of legal immunities, he or she is given a kind of protection from 
the laws thus violated.12 And that raises a key issue for an assessment of the 
policy objectives underlying civil limitation laws and their moral 
underpinning.  If we hold that civil laws have a protective function over and 
above their primary restorative and compensatory functions – in operating, 
in some measure, to disincentivise certain types of wrongdoing – then, one 
would imagine, any attempt to negate that end, particularly a legally 
sanctioned one that effectively protects wrongdoers, would call for an 
equivalently compelling moral and policy justification. In the narrower 
context of the present discussion, then, we might ask whether the rationale 
for civil laws in the area of tort (in Scots law, delict) that give some measure 
of protection to children against the harm caused by childhood abuse is at 
least commensurate with the rationale for the conferment of immunity from 
such laws through civil limitation laws. In pursuing this question, the 
Brisbane case, as already indicated, provides a useful repository of reasons 
of legal policy justifying the statutory limitation of civil law claims. The critical 
exploration of Justice McHugh’s opinion in that case, which now follows, 
commences with a brief outline of one or two relatively recent cases 
                                                          
12 Essentially, as has already been noted (see Introduction above), an assumption must be made that 
the individual has in fact violated relevant civil law prohibitions and that, had relevant allegations 
been tested in civil law proceedings which had not been halted by the operation of civil limitation 
laws, the truth of the allegations would have been established to the satisfaction of, and standard of 
proof required by, a court. 
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(including a House of Lords decision) that have accorded the opinion a 
striking degree of significance. 
 
3 Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor  
 
What is immediately surprising about judicial reliance on the Brisbane case 
is that, on one hand, the case has nothing specific to say about historical 
childhood abuse claims while, on the other, the opinion of McHugh J largely 
summarises general legal policy arguments for the existence of civil 
limitation laws outlined in earlier case law and other sources without itself 
necessarily innovating upon, or adding materially to, the sources cited. This 
makes it perhaps all the more puzzling that judicial reliance on McHugh J’s 
opinion in civil law claims alleging childhood abuse has been so pervasive 
and, more often than not, uncritical, in relatively recent case law.  
 
For instance, in the Scottish case of B v Murray (No 2)13 – a case concerning 
allegations of historical physical abuse of children – Lord Drummond Young 
commented (sweepingly) that all of the rationales for civil limitation laws 
outlined by McHugh J in the Brisbane case applied to the case then before 
the court; though the loss of evidence rationale (see the first rationale 
discussed below) perhaps precipitated his decision on the basis that, in 
evidentiary terms, quality of justice is invariably assumed to deteriorate with 
                                                          
13 Above n 7, at [21–28], but especially at [21] (Lord Drummond Young). 
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the lapse of time. In the House of Lords decision in Bowden v Poor Sisters of 
Nazareth and Others,14 Lord Hope endorsed Lord Drummond Young’s 
position (indirectly derived from McHugh J’s opinion) that one of the key 
objectives of civil limitation laws is to avoid the real possibility of significant 
prejudice befalling the party sued.15 In the same case, Lord Hope also 
approved the public interest argument articulated by McHugh J in the 
Brisbane case.16 (See the fourth rationale discussed below.) 
 
It is important to note that the Brisbane case has been cited approvingly not 
only in childhood abuse cases originating in the Scottish courts but in like 
cases decided under English law (usually) in the context of judicial discussion 
of the rationales underpinning civil limitation laws.17 And, as might be 
expected of a case originating in the Australian High Court, the case is 
routinely cited in civil litigation arising in Australia.18 
 
                                                          
14 Above n 7. 
15 Ibid, at [25]. 
16 Ibid, at [5]. 
17 See Vincent Roland Albonetti v Metropolitan Borough of Wirral [2008] EWHC 3523 (QB), especially 
at [18] (McKinnon J). See also F, S v TH [2016] EWHC 1605 (QB), at [12] (Langstaff J). English case law 
that does not expressly cite the Brisbane case but nonetheless supports or gives credence to McHugh 
J’s primary rationale for such laws, namely his first rationale discussed below – ie deterioration of 
evidence over time, more often than not expressed as the judicial imperative to resist ‘stale claims’ – 
has been taken as a given in leading cases. See, for instance, A v Hoare [2008] 1 AC 844, especially 
Baroness Hale at [54]. See also Yew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Maria [1983] 1 AC 553, at 563 (Lord 
Brightman); AB v The Catholic Child Welfare Society (Diocese of Middlesbrough) and Others [2016] 
EWHC 3334 (QB); and RE v GE [2015] EWCA Civ 287. In Dobbie v Medway [1994] 1 WLR 1234, Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR comments at p 1238: ‘[Civil limitation rules are] no doubt designed in part to 
encourage potential claimants to prosecute their claims with reasonable expedition on pain of being 
unable to prosecute them at all. But they are also based on the belief that a time comes when, for 
better or worse, defendants should be effectively relieved from the risk of having to resist stale 
claims’. 
18 See, for example, Carter v Corporation of the Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton & Ors 
[2001] QCA 335, especially at [19] and [34] (McPherson JA); and Howley v Principal Healthcare Finance 
Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 447, especially at [46–48] (McColl JA). 
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So, using the opinion of McHugh J as a convenient springboard, there follows 
a critical discussion of each of the rationales for civil limitation laws outlined 
in his opinion – both generally and in terms of the appropriateness of each 
rationale when viewed in the particular context of historical childhood abuse 
claims. The first and most frequently cited rationale for civil limitation laws 
centres on the deterioration in the quality of justice that is said to occur 
when there is a delay in pursuing appropriate civil law proceedings. That is 
the rationale to which we now turn our attention. 
 
3.1 Rationale: deterioration in quality of justice by reason of delay 
 
At the broadest level the case for civil limitation laws conventionally turns 
on the idea, highlighted by Lord Hailsham in the context of a criminal appeal, 
that where there is delay ‘the whole quality of justice deteriorates’.19 Delay 
is perhaps the most convincing rationale for civil limitation laws out of all of 
those outlined by McHugh J and has often been uncritically accepted 
whenever the applicability of civil limitation laws is judicially under 
discussion. 
 
As time passes, evidence relevant to a case may be entirely lost or become 
unobtainable, such as where important documents (eg files, papers, notes 
of meetings or conversations, and so on) have been disposed of or 
                                                          
19 R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510, especially at 517 (Hailsham of St Marylebone LC). 
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destroyed, or forensic evidence is no longer obtainable, or a key witness has 
died. Memories of significant events or circumstances may fade and indeed 
significance itself may be called into question, such as where the relationship 
between an event or circumstance to a cause of action is ‘no longer as 
apparent as it was when the cause of action arose’.20 At worst, important – 
even decisive – evidence may disappear without anyone knowing that it ever 
existed. There is no doubt that these are important qualifications upon the 
ability of a court or other forum of enquiry even to arrive at the truth, far 
less to render justice where court proceedings are concerned.  
 
But should it be assumed that passage of time always and necessarily 
diminishes the quality, or restricts the availability, of the evidence upon 
which a civil claim or other proceedings might be based? For instance, 
changes in public attitudes may create a new climate of openness to public 
debate where activities previously regarded as taboo or ‘off‐limits’ to 
discussion – incest, for example – come to be discussed and commented 
upon more freely in the public domain. In appropriate situations, such as 
where the relevant activities are criminally or civilly wrongful, individuals 
may be more willing to come forward and report offences to the authorities 
or give evidence to a court or recount their personal experiences in a public 
or private setting. It may be that the weight of similar evidence from a 
variety of witnesses – which, it may be assumed, would not necessarily come 
                                                          
20 Brisbane case, above n 6, p 551 (McHugh J). 
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to light but for the emergence, through the passage of time, of a climate of 
openness – may be all the more credible the more consistent the evidence 
of witnesses is across the board.21 
 
Furthermore, broad assumptions about the fallibility and unreliability of 
eyewitness evidence, and evidence based on direct experience – being 
necessarily reliant upon the vagaries of memory – may need modifying to 
take account of the uniqueness of individual cases. For instance, in R v 
Lawrence, Lord Hailsham comments as follows: 
 
Our system depends on the recollection of witnesses, conveyed to a 
jury by oral testimony. As the months pass, this recollection 
necessarily dims, and juries who are correctly directed not to convict 
unless they are assured of the reliability of the evidence for the 
prosecution, necessarily tend to acquit as this becomes less precise, 
and sometimes less reliable.22 
 
While Lord Hailsham’s observation may seem unassailable as a general 
proposition it remains a fact that certain witness experiences can be so 
                                                          
21 In recent years the introduction of freedom of information laws in the UK and elsewhere has 
enabled individuals to gain access to records or information previously inaccessible or protected. 
Here, key information would not become available but for the passage of time towards a new era of 
openness. See JM Ackerman and IE Sandoval‐Ballesteros ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom of 
Information Laws’ (2006) 58 Administrative Law Review 85–130. Ackerman and Sandoval‐Ballesteros 
comment as follows (at p 99): ‘An ideal [freedom of information] law should cover all bodies that 
receive money, including all branches of government, autonomous agencies, non‐profit organizations, 
individuals, private contractors, and foundations. It would also open up to public scrutiny any ‘body’ 
that carries out a function vital to the public interest (for example, private hospitals, schools, prisons), 
regardless of whether it receives government funding’. 
22 Above n 19, p 517. 
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traumatising that vivid memories remain with witnesses for a lifetime, 
particularly if the witness is, at one and the same time, victim – at the 
receiving end of violent, abusive or inhumane treatment. The idea that the 
memories of this kind of witness would necessarily dim is at least 
questionable, and takes no account of the psychological make‐up of 
individuals who have undergone definingly negative experiences. Thus, in a 
study of adult women who had experienced incest in childhood, members 
of the study group affirmed that what they had experienced was ‘the most 
psychologically traumatic and damaging event of their lives’.23 Moreover 
reports continue to emerge from different parts of the world of the historical 
experiences of children – such as residents of educational establishments – 
who have been subjected to abuse over lengthy periods where the abuser 
has been the same person. Clearly, in such a situation individual instances of 
abuse – the precise nature of the abusive acts committed on a particular 
date and the exact number of times when such acts were committed – may 
be difficult, if not impossible, to recall in detail. But it is minimally likely that 
the victim would recall that the abuses in question took the form of a 
prolonged and sustained course of conduct on the part of a single 
perpetrator.24 In some cases that fact alone may serve to make the abuse 
                                                          
23 See F Lindberg and L Distad, above n 11, at 331. 
24 For example, see Royal Commonwealth of Australia Royal Commission into Institutional Responses 
to Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Report of Case Study No 11 – Congregation of Christian Brothers in Western 
Australia response to child sexual abuse at Castledare Junior Orphanage, St Vincent’s Orphanage 
Clontarf, St Mary’s Agricultural School Tardun and Bindoon Farm School’ (2014) available at: 
http://childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/getattachment/27a80b05‐2b21‐48ec‐bd94‐
2f3f02522596/Report‐of‐Case‐Study‐no‐11 (accessed 26 July 2017). Para 2.1 on p 21 reports an adult 
witness’s recollection of prolonged abuse by the same individual: ‘Mr Albert McGregor described 
being psychologically abused by Brother Murphy at Castledare. The abuse first started when he was 
about eight years old and continued until he was about 12 years old, when he had a nervous 
breakdown’. 
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unforgettable, even if the wider factual context of the abuse, and matters of 
detail not especially relevant to the abuse, are difficult to recollect.25 
 
Ultimately, it may seem ironic that the most compelling case for civil 
limitation laws cited by McHugh J centres on the idea (given expression by 
Lord Hailsham) that delay in the criminal law setting causes the whole quality 
of justice to deteriorate. In the civil law context this appears to resolve into 
a more convincing case, indeed a plea, for ensuring that evidence in civil 
proceedings is the subject of appropriately rigorous methods of testing and 
evaluation than for ensuring that civil law rights (of purported longevity) are, 
at least for practical purposes, ‘extinguished’.26 In other words it seems 
drastic that the preferred solution to the problem of evidentiary 
deterioration might be found in what amounts to – for most practical 
purposes – the elimination of civil law rights after the lapse of an arbitrarily 
determined and usually relatively short period of time,27 rather than (for 
                                                          
25 See K Westcott and T de Castella ‘The decades‐long shadow of abuse’ BBC News Magazine (London: 
25 October 2012) available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine‐20066508 (accessed 26 July 
2017). As Lucy Duckworth, a (now adult) victim of abuse in childhood and child abuse campaigner 
comments in this article: ‘Not fully understanding at the time that the abuse was wrong, the child 
[who is being subjected to abuse at a given time] is not attempting to absorb detail … . Decades later, 
being quizzed by a detective, the adult victim can find it hard to recall the colour of a carpet or the 
orientation of a room. These are the details that can underpin a witness statement’. 
26 Looking at Scots law, technically, civil limitation laws do not operate to extinguish rights. The option 
to apply limitation laws in the context of a particular claim ordinarily lies with the party sued, so that 
for all practical and legal purposes when limitation laws are successfully invoked the claimant’s 
substantive rights become unenforceable. (In that situation it may matter little that the underlying 
substantive rights remain intact.) 
27 Under English law (Limitation Act 1980, s 11) the limitation period applying to an action for damages 
in respect of personal injury is three years from the date on which the action accrued or the date of 
knowledge (if later) of the person injured. In Scotland, with the enactment of the Limitation 
(Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 on 28 July 2017, a three‐year limitation period in respect of 
personal injuries not resulting in death was disapplied in childhood abuse cases. (The Act came into 
effect on 4 October 2017.) The Scottish position in the light of the 2017 Act (and its likely pitfalls and 
constraints) and the court’s discretionary power under English law (ie the Limitation Act 1980, s 33) 
to disapply the 1980 Act, s 11 (as interpreted by A v Hoare, above n 17) are discussed further below. 
Previously in Scotland the optimum period within which civil redress had to be commenced lapsed as 
soon as a (potential) claimant attained the age of 19. Under Scots law it was necessary for a claimant 
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instance) in attempts to improve techniques of collection, preservation and 
testing of evidence; or to make suppressed evidence more accessible; or to 
tighten rules of procedure and evidence (to make the rules more exacting); 
or to introduce general measures to address delays in the administration of 
justice. Moreover, the grounding of the key rationale for civil limitation laws 
in an assumption that passage of time diminishes the quality or availability 
of evidence appears to preclude the possibility of testing that assumption in 
actual cases. Thus civil limitation laws largely operate without the party sued 
being required to demonstrate – eg by way of an appropriately diligent 
investigation – that relevant evidence, records and witnesses are in fact 
unavailable or inaccessible and that this would prejudice that party’s 
interests in civil proceedings.28 It is a kind of defeatism to assume that the 
passage of what is often a relatively short limitation period will necessarily 
cause evidentiary deterioration including, in Lord Hailsham’s words, 
deterioration in ‘the whole quality of justice’. This approach transforms a 
claimed concern for quality of justice overall – implying justice for the party 
                                                          
to raise an action before reaching that age in order to avoid the action being time‐barred. The three‐
year limitation period started to run when a potential claimant reached 16 – being the age of full legal 
capacity. This was the position under the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 17(2) and 
(3), construed with the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, s 1(2). 
28 It is noteworthy that, when pressed on the matter, the Archbishop of Dublin, Diarmuid Martin, 
handed over more than 60,000 previously secret church files to the Commission of Investigation into 
the Catholic Archdiocese of Dublin – an enquiry into the handling of child abuse cases by the 
archdiocese between 1975 and 2004, which reported in July 2009. See ‘Catholic church in Ireland 
covered up child abuse, says report’ The Guardian (London: 26 November 2009) available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/26/catholic‐church‐ireland‐child‐abuse (accessed 26 
July 2017). The written evidence in the church files had not deteriorated over time; it was simply being 
held under lock and key. As The Guardian article notes: ‘Among the files were more than 5,500 
Martin's predecessor, the retired cardinal Desmond Connell, tried to keep locked in the archbishop's 
private vault’. It is also clear that changes through time in the management or culture of an 
organisation, or a change of local, regional or national government, may encourage a more 
cooperative attitude towards the sharing or disclosure of information to which access has formerly 
been restricted or denied. (On the other hand, many organisations have legitimate space‐saving file‐
destruction policies that are not in any way sinister and lead inevitably to loss of potentially important 
factual information and records.) 
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suing as well as the party sued – into a concern to give primacy to the 
interests of only one of the parties: namely, the party sued. 
 
In historical childhood abuse cases the invocation of civil limitation laws 
often excludes any kind of weighing of the consequences of the claims being 
time‐barred – namely, the loss of opportunity to enforce accrued rights and 
(if the claim is successful) to secure compensation – against the seriousness 
of the harm suffered by the claimant. The fact that civil limitation laws may 
often be relatively straightforward to invoke successfully may lessen any 
perceived deterrent effect of the substantive civil laws upon which claims 
are based – in other words, laws that contribute (albeit by way of civil law 
mechanisms) to the protection of a child’s emotional, physical and sexual 
integrity. The protection afforded to children by the relevant laws is merely 
contingent if civil law remedies come to be excluded at a later date through 
the successful invocation of civil limitation laws. Such contingency, of course, 
holds for a wider range of civil laws than those aimed at protecting children 
– and correspondingly wider classes of potential claimant – but the fact that 
childhood abuse often in itself inhibits or delays the pursuit of civil law 
redress (owing to psychological injury caused to victims) implies that civil 
limitation laws impact more negatively in historical childhood abuse cases 
than other types of case unaffected by such inhibiting factors. Obviously at 
the time when applicable civil laws purport to afford a measure of protection 
from harm – usually operating in tandem with relevant criminal laws – no 
one can predict with certainty whether limitation laws will be successfully 
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invoked at some time in the future, or indeed whether timely civil law 
redress will be pursued. But if we take the view that, for reasons including 
basic needs fulfilment and special vulnerability, the legal protection of 
children against harm, viewed as a central case, ought to be given primacy, 
the availability of limitation laws does little to facilitate that. Seen from the 
perspective of the wrongdoer, the presence of civil limitation laws 
potentially giving immunity (ie in effect protection) from the operation of 
otherwise protective civil laws,29 may lead wrongdoers to believe that they 
may act with (civil law if not criminal law) impunity, relying on the not 
unrealistic possibility that limitation laws may be successfully invoked in 
future proceedings. This in turn implies the unsettling question whether a 
perceived ‘licence’ (under the civil law) to commit abusive and harmful acts 
against children might contribute to progressive ‘moral acclimatisation’ in 
terms of the attitudes of those who may be inclined to commit such acts. In 
other words, what is perceived as ‘acceptable’ under the civil law might be 
thought to be morally less reprehensible. 
 
And all of this brings to the fore a puzzling disparity in the treatment of 
criminal and civil cases by the law. In the recent past numerous serious cases 
                                                          
29 In Hohfeldian terms a legal immunity is represented as the ‘jural opposite’ of a legal power 
(subsisting in a power–liability jural relation). See generally WN Hohfeld, (and WW Cook, ed) 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1919). Where a legal immunity is successfully invoked in the context of the purported 
exercise of a police power of arrest, such as by a diplomat claiming immunity under the Diplomatic 
Privileges Act 1964, the immunity negates (or constitutes an exemption from) the operation of the 
power. Likewise, when civil limitation laws are successfully invoked, the party seeking to rely on the 
laws in civil law proceedings is claiming what is effectively an exemption from those proceedings. The 
underlying rights upon which the proceedings are founded remain intact, albeit unenforceable. 
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of historical childhood abuse in the UK have been the subject of criminal 
prosecutions despite significant lapse of time and the attendant claimed 
difficulties of obtaining adequate evidence. In the relevant cases the 
additional hurdle of the higher burden of proof applicable in criminal cases 
has apparently not stood in the way of successful prosecutions. Yet civil 
proceedings – in some cases apparently arising directly out of (the success 
of) the criminal prosecutions30 – have foundered on the rock of civil 
limitation laws whose central justification, as we have seen, is to address the 
concern that the loss or deterioration of evidence through delay may 
diminish the quality of justice. It seems incongruous that evidence 
considered convincing enough to achieve convictions before criminal courts 
– despite the passage of time – might be regarded as necessarily inferior or 
inadequate in a parallel situation where a civil claim is in prospect and where 
identical evidence need only be established on balance of probabilities.31 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 For example, a civil claim centring on brutal physical treatment and sexual abuse by adults employed 
at Kerelaw Residential School, Stevenston, Ayrshire – see CG v Glasgow City Council 2011 SC 1 – was 
held to be time‐barred by civil limitation laws despite the civil proceedings being preceded by 
successful criminal prosecutions. (The prosecutions are reported on in ‘Campaigners warn ex‐Kerelaw 
staff of further abuse claims’ The Herald/heraldscotland (Glasgow: 29 June 2006) available at 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/campaigners‐warn‐ex‐kerelaw‐staff‐of‐
further‐abuse‐claims‐1.16228 (accessed 26 July 2017).) 
31 The frequent inability of adult victims of historical childhood abuse to pursue civil law redress 
successfully against wrongdoers due to time‐barring of claims also sends out a perversely mixed 
message, to wrongdoers and victims alike, that while the ability to pursue a criminal prosecution in 
general appears to be relatively unaffected by the passage of time (at least from such evidence as 
there is in the public domain), the law through the operation of civil limitation laws adopts an 
approach to civil claims signalling that abusive behaviour can be practised with impunity merely 
because a defined period of time has elapsed; and usually quite a short period at that. Such behaviour 
is in effect being ‘tolerated’ by the civil law. 
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3.2 Rationale: cruelty and long dormancy 
 
The second rationale outlined by McHugh J centres upon the idea that it may 
be oppressive or even cruel to a defendant to allow a civil action to be 
brought long after the circumstances which gave rise to it have passed. It is 
difficult to imagine something that could be thought to be cruel which is not 
at the same time harmful, even if transiently. It may be, however, that the 
primary focus of our interest should be on cruelty that causes lasting, rather 
than merely transient, harm. To that end we have already seen that the 
harmful effects of certain forms of childhood abuse – which is child cruelty 
by any definition – can be long‐lasting, if not permanent. What is notable 
about the second rationale, of course, is that it turns on a concern that 
cruelty may be suffered by the party sued, not the party suing. So, in the case 
of civil law claims brought by adults in respect of allegations of historical 
abuse in childhood, the ‘cruelty’ suffered by the perpetrator of the abuse, or 
by a party (at least in principle) deemed vicariously liable, becomes the 
central preoccupation underpinning the second rationale, not that suffered 
by the victim. The key to the second rationale lies in the opinion of Best CJ 
in A’Court v Cross32 where the point is made that ‘[l]ong dormant claims have 
often more of cruelty than of justice in them’. This posits an overly simplistic 
opposition between what is intrinsically morally wrong (the infliction of 
                                                          
32 (1825) 3 Bing 329, at 332. (Note that in the Brisbane case McHugh J makes reference to R B Policies 
at Lloyd’s v Butler [1950] 1 KB 76 at 81–82 in which Streatfeild J in turn (at p 82) refers to the opinion 
of Best C J in A’Court v Cross.) 
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cruelty) and what is presumptively morally right (acting to address the 
demands of justice). 
 
There are two, more immediately pressing, issues for consideration here – 
‘cruelty’ and long dormancy. The rationale suggests that the making of a civil 
law claim is not necessarily ‘cruel’ if it is timely, but becomes ‘cruel’ when it 
is long dormant. Disregarding long dormancy for the moment, it has to be 
said that at first sight the idea of ‘cruelty’ and of ‘oppressiveness’ sit 
somewhat awkwardly with the notion of a typical claim under the civil law. 
The making of restitution, or putting right the harm caused by a wrong, or 
making amends, occupies an obviously different moral universe from one 
characterised by the infliction of cruel treatment or punishment, particularly 
where the relevant legal culture, such as one in the democratic, liberal 
tradition, views restitution, more often than not, in terms of paying 
compensation in money. In other words, in the modern era such a culture 
typically outlaws forms of restitution that would insist on the more 
unsavoury and cruel forms of ‘putting things right’. Moreover, some regard 
must be had to the era in which Chief Justice Best rendered his opinion in 
A’Court v Cross. This was the reign of George IV (1820–1830) when civil 
imprisonment, as the ultimate civil enforcement mechanism, was prevalent. 
One legal historian has referred to debtors’ prisons as ‘mansions of 
misery’.33 When Chief Justice Best’s ‘cruelty’ remark is nowadays cited as a 
                                                          
33 See MC Finn The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740–1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) ch 3. 
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justification for civil limitation laws it would be appropriate for there to be 
some acknowledgement of the historical context of the remark and the 
drastic civil enforcement regimes prevalent at the time. 
 
Furthermore, the real or imagined ‘cruelties’ assigned to civil law redress by 
advocates of civil limitation laws appear insignificant when reckoned beside 
the very real cruelties of child abuse whose harmful effects, as we have seen, 
often cast a long shadow into adulthood or endure for a lifetime. And 
regardless of impact in adulthood, many forms of child abuse are intrinsically 
cruel and harmful, and exploit children’s vulnerability and relative lack of 
ability to defend themselves from abuse or to assert and enforce legal rights 
arising from their mistreatment. There is thus an obviously stronger case for 
maintaining whatever deterrent effect there is in civil laws rendering child 
cruelty actionable than to be sensitive to the alleged cruelty of pursuing a 
legitimate legal process against an alleged wrongdoer who may be 
undeserving of such concern. 
 
And as soon as the focus moves from a wrongdoer who is an individual – a 
natural person, in other words – to an impersonal corporate or institutional 
wrongdoer, where liability for civil wrongs may be vicariously assigned, can 
one intelligibly speak of being ‘cruel’ to (for example) a governmental 
authority, a church, a board of trustees of a school, an insurance company? 
In particular, is it credible to describe the pursuit of a claim against an 
organisation such as an insurance company, for instance, as ‘cruel’ when the 
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raison d’être of the insurance industry is to recompense policy holders in 
respect of losses arising from risks voluntarily undertaken? Is it appropriate 
in other words to designate as ‘cruelty’ the requirement for an insurance 
company to meet claims when that is literally what it is in existence to do? 
Many civil law claims on the part of adults in respect of allegations of 
historical abuse in childhood are pursued against just such corporate actors 
where the idea of ‘cruelty’ is plainly absurd. 
 
If, ultimately, it cannot be said that forms of restitution (civil law redress) are 
intrinsically cruel or oppressive it would seem to follow that only the idea of 
long dormancy can supply the otherwise absent element of cruelty and 
oppressiveness highlighted by Chief Justice Best. In that regard it may be 
arguable that it is ‘cruel’ for a claimant deliberately to wait many years 
before instigating civil law redress against an alleged wrongdoing individual 
(ie a natural person as opposed to a corporate actor) if the motivation for 
the delay is deliberately calculated (say) to impact on the alleged wrongdoer 
late in life.34 Without this element of calculation the idea of a claimant 
knowingly inflicting ‘cruelty’ upon an alleged wrongdoer in a modern civil 
law setting seems unsustainable. Moreover, in the context of adult civil law 
claims in historical child abuse cases – as we shall consider below – the 
reason for delayed claims generally has nothing to do with the exploitation 
of any age‐related vulnerabilities of alleged wrongdoers. 
                                                          
34 For this purpose, of course, it is necessary to ‘hypothesise away’ civil limitation laws:  either to 
disregard any effect they might happen to have, or to make the assumption that a claim will fall within 
a recognised exception to the operation of such laws. 
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3.3 Rationale: arrangement of affairs such that claims can no longer be 
made after lapse of time 
 
The third rationale highlighted by McHugh J in the Brisbane case turns on 
the idea that people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilise their 
resources such that claims can no longer be made against them once a 
defined period of time has elapsed. McHugh J mainly focuses this rationale 
upon the needs of commercial enterprises and other (largely incorporated) 
entities – ie insurers, public institutions, businesses and limited liability 
companies – which have a ‘significant interest in knowing that they have no 
liabilities beyond a definite period’.35 In the same context McHugh J further 
prioritises the interests of the commercial world, citing the Tasmanian law 
commissioner’s report on limitation of actions: 
 
The threat of open‐ended liability from unforeseen claims may be an 
unreasonable burden on business. Limitation periods may allow for 
more accurate and certain assessment of potential liability.36 
 
Adopting a standpoint that gives primacy to commercial expediency may be 
defensible in the context of claims of a certain kind. It can make good 
commercial sense for certain types of claim – particularly claims arising in 
                                                          
35 Brisbane case, above n 6, p 552. 
36 The Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania Limitation of Actions for Latent Personal Injuries, Report 
No 69 (1992), 10. 
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the course of ordinary business activities – to be subject to the guillotining 
effect of limitation laws. Workplace accidents are an obvious example. An 
employer will not wish to have a potential claim arising from a workplace 
injury hanging over its head for an indeterminate time – nor, by extension 
will the employer’s insurer. The presence of civil limitation laws ensures that 
both employer and insurer are able to rely on the near‐certainty of the 
barring of such claims after the passage of a defined period of time, allowing 
for some measure of forward planning.  
 
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how this rationale can be viewed 
completely in isolation from the standpoint of a potential claimant. It is clear 
that McHugh J views the matter through the eyes of the party sued. As soon 
as one is committed to identifying ‘significant interests’, the prioritisation of 
the interests of the party sued over the party suing seems one‐sided in the 
absence of some discussion and weighing up of both categories of interest. 
In this context, what is the interest of the party suing – ie the potential 
claimant? If the party sued – such as a commercial enterprise that is found 
to be vicariously liable for wrongdoing committed by its employees37 – has 
an interest in knowing that it will have no liability beyond a certain period 
do not victims of civil wrongs in principle have an equivalent interest in the 
expectation that claims will continue to be actionable for at least the 
foreseeable future, if not indefinitely? These competing interests and 
                                                          
37 See Catholic Child Welfare Society and others v The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools 
[2012] UKSC 56. 
 28 
perspectives are not seriously evaluated and reconciled in McHugh J’s 
opinion. Moreover, viewed in terms of the ability, through the operation of 
civil limitation laws, to predict the certainty of failure of future civil law 
claims on account of the passage of time, McHugh J’s commercial 
expediency rationale seemingly takes priority over the moral imperative of 
making restitution for negligent or wrongful behaviour. 
 
Allegations of historical childhood abuse are often made against 
organisations that are run on a commercial basis or, directly or indirectly, 
have a commercial aspect to some or all of their activities – for instance, 
boarding schools, churches, church‐run orphanages, and local 
(governmental) authorities that run or subsidise children’s homes. Obviously 
care and protection of children from harm is a key part of the activities of 
these organisations. A failure to provide, or shortcomings in, care and 
protection could be seen as a failure to conduct an important aspect of their 
everyday activities.38 Child abuse, looked upon as injury or harm deliberately 
inflicted on a child, is not only emphatically a failure to discharge relevant 
responsibilities but – in terms of the seriousness of the breaches of duty and 
of trust characteristic of such abuse – could be regarded as the negation of 
those responsibilities; in other words, defective performance writ large. It is 
difficult to see how something significantly more culpable than a bare failure 
in performance – ie wrongdoing knowingly and deliberately committed – 
                                                          
38 It is noteworthy that in a commercial setting reward usually follows performance such that a failure 
to perform, or defective performance, usually results in no reward, or less reward, or compensation. 
(That is certainly implied by the contractual basis of most commercial activities.) 
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could engage laws, justified on the basis of commercial expediency, that 
provide immunity from the civil law (ie tortious or delictual) consequences 
of such wrongdoing. There is nothing inherently ‘commercial’ about such 
wrongdoing – or the actions of its ‘hands‐on’ perpetrators – that would 
make it appropriate to use a commercial expediency rationale as a 
justification for laws that can, for all practical purposes, frustrate civil law 
claims arising from allegations of such wrongdoing. Why should an 
organisation that is not doing what it should be doing be legally protected 
from the consequences of its omissions? 
 
Even where the notion of arranging one’s affairs is considered in isolation 
from the idea of commercial expediency – to strengthen the former against 
the claim that the latter impairs what could otherwise be a defensible 
rationale for civil limitation laws – the absence of a commercial element 
arguably does little to ‘rescue’ this rationale in cases involving allegations of 
historical childhood abuse. The tactic of arranging one’s affairs to avoid a 
legal liability – whether criminal or civil – is often defensible in a variety of 
contexts. One need only think of legitimate tax avoidance measures that 
may be taken in order to mitigate liability to various kinds of tax. Tax evasion, 
of course, is a different matter and, like other criminal activity and 
wrongdoing, is usually attended by efforts to conceal it or cover it up. 
Criminally inclined persons invariably arrange their affairs to avoid criminal 
liability. In the case of conduct falling short of criminal behaviour, 
wrongdoers may likewise take steps to avoid the censure associated with 
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their wrongdoing. As Max Weber reminds us, a thief orients his action to the 
validity of the criminal law in that he acts surreptitiously.39  
 
All of this has a special resonance in the context of allegations of historical 
childhood abuse where it would appear that arranging one’s affairs to avoid 
legal liability or censure or reputational damage is as natural and predictable 
a concomitant of the wrong as would be the concealment or cover‐up of a 
robbery, a murder or fraud. For obvious reasons, perpetrators of abuse often 
go to great lengths to conceal their abusive behaviour. But there has also 
been increased recognition, in cases involving alleged historical childhood 
abuse in (for example) educational or religious or care‐giving environments, 
that alleged perpetrators have routinely been sheltered and assisted by the 
very organisations to which they have been attached. Moreover, in the 
relatively recent past the Supreme Court has recognised that vicarious 
liability can attach to an organisation whose workers have perpetrated child 
abuse.40 Inevitably, claimants will be more inclined to pursue a claim against 
                                                          
39 Max Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Eng tr of Part I of Economy and Society, 
AM Henderson and T Parsons (trans) and T Parsons (ed); New York: The Free Press, 1947), 125. In the 
criminal law setting (in the UK and other common law jurisdictions) concealment and cover‐up may 
be an element in the separate offence of perverting the course of justice. This can involve falsifying or 
disposing of evidence. It seems perverse that the civil law could confer a kind of legal advantage upon 
wrongdoers in childhood abuse cases – such as child rape, that would be serious enough to constitute 
a criminal offence – on the supposed basis that wrongdoers have acted somehow ‘prudently’ in 
arranging their affairs to avoid a civil law liability when the conferment of a like advantage in the 
criminal law setting would be inconceivable. 
40 Catholic Child Welfare Society and others v The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, 
above n 37. That vicarious liability, in the legal context, can be fraught with difficulty in historical 
childhood abuse cases is illustrated by a recent Supreme Court decision which considers, among other 
things, whether vicarious liability should extend to a local authority which had placed the claimant 
(when in childhood) in the care of foster parents. See Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] 
UKSC 60. 
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an organisation perceived as having ‘deeper pockets’ than an alleged ‘hands‐
on’ perpetrator of abuse who will be (merely) a private individual. What that 
means is that an alleged ‘hands‐on’ perpetrator of abuse may be doubly 
protected from civil law liability even if criminal liability is unaffected. They 
may be shielded by vicarious liability and civil limitation laws, with civil 
limitation laws also being potentially available for the protection of the 
organisation being sued. Moreover, we should not rush to assume that 
organisations that are sued for the alleged historical wrongdoings of their 
employees or workers are necessarily blameless and therefore undeserving 
of having the burden of civil liability imposed upon them. Less culpable is the 
organisation that is found to have been vicariously liable for the abusive acts 
of an employee or worker where it has had an entirely passive and unwitting 
involvement in the wrongdoing. Significantly more culpable is the 
organisation that has in some sense actively perpetuated wrongdoing or 
wilfully turned a blind eye. There are differing levels and varieties of 
participation of organisations in wrongdoing corresponding to levels and 
varieties of culpability. 
 
For instance, it has been reported that by 1990 all Roman Catholic dioceses 
in Ireland had insured themselves against the risk of potential civil law 
liability arising from historical clerical childhood abuse claims (despite later 
Church claims that senior clergy had no knowledge of the fact, or extent, of 
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abuses perpetrated by errant clergy).41 Taking out insurance for the purpose 
of mitigating or offloading the risks of civil law liability was coupled with 
other patterns of behaviour which – taken as a whole – pointed to a strategy 
of reputational protectionism and cover‐up. This could only have served to 
perpetuate criminal and civil wrongdoing against children, albeit at 
constantly changing locations, given the reportedly widespread practice 
within the Church hierarchy in many parts of the world of dealing with the 
issue by moving priests suspected of abuse from one location to another.42 
 
When the tendency to conceal and cover‐up instances of childhood abuse is 
linked to the idea of arranging one’s affairs (viewed as a conventional 
rationale for civil limitation laws) it is clear that alleged wrongdoers – not 
                                                          
41 See D McDonald ‘How bishops formed strategy to fight claims of child abuse’ Irish Independent 
(Dublin: 26 November 2012) available at http://www.independent.ie/irish‐news/how‐bishops‐
formed‐strategy‐to‐fight‐claims‐of‐child‐abuse‐26421418.html (accessed 26 July 2017). The strategy 
of insuring against the risk of civil law claims arising from allegations of historical childhood abuse is 
commented on at length in chapter 9 of Judge Y Murphy (principal author and Commission 
chairperson) Report by Commission of Investigation into Catholic Archdiocese of Dublin (Dublin: 
Government Publications Office, 2009) available at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PB09000504 (accessed 26 July 2017). 
42 In the case of one notorious perpetrator of child sexual abuse in Ireland, Northern Ireland and the 
USA (Father Brendan Smyth) ‘…the cleric, a member of the Norbertine order, was moved between 
parishes, dioceses and even countries where he preyed on victims who were as young as eight years 
old’. See ‘Profile of Father Brendan Smyth’ BBC News Online (15 March 2010) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/8567868.stm (accessed 26 July 2017). This article also 
mentions the practice within the Catholic Church of obtaining signed ‘oaths of secrecy’ from victims 
of clerical abuse. In the context of out‐of‐court settlement of abuse claims this presumably equates 
to signed confidentiality agreements which are, of course, only a further means of scandal 
containment which do nothing for other abuse victims or potential abuse victims. See L Goodstein, N 
Cumming‐Bruce and J Yardley ‘UN Panel Criticizes the Vatican over Sexual Abuse’ The New York Times 
(New York: 5 February 2014) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/world/europe/un‐
panel‐assails‐vatican‐over‐sex‐abuse‐by‐priests.html?_r=0 (accessed 26 July 2017): ‘On the many 
pressing problems related to child welfare, the [UN CRC] report recommended specific steps it said 
the Vatican should take: stop obstructing efforts by victims’ advocates in some countries to extend 
statutes of limitations, which now allow most abusers to escape prosecution; stop insisting that 
victims sign confidentiality agreements swearing them to silence as a condition for receiving 
compensation …’. (The report referred to in The New York Times article is: UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child Concluding observations on the second periodic report of the Holy See (CRC/C/VAT/CO/2, 
25 February 2014) available at: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CRC/Shared%20Documents/VAT/CRC_C_VAT_CO_2_16302_E.
pdf (accessed 26 July 2017).) 
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only ‘hands‐on’ perpetrators, but organisations that have allegedly 
sheltered such perpetrators or perpetuated their wrongdoing – may be 
placed in a uniquely advantageous position to evade civil law redress. When 
a defined period of time has elapsed any resulting legal protection afforded 
to alleged wrongdoers by civil limitation laws may be seen as only the final 
‘nail in the coffin’ to the pursuit of civil law redress. Often adult perpetrators 
of abuse will (at the time when the abuses occurred) have been in a position 
to exercise an extraordinary measure of control over child victims, 
determining victims’ ability and preparedness to report abuse, and in some 
cases punishing children for reporting abuse.43 In cases of institutional abuse 
the institution will invariably have had physical custody of records and have 
been in a position to control the availability of (and therefore to suppress or 
indeed destroy) potentially significant documentary and other evidence. In 
addition, institutional environments – eg orphanages, children’s homes, 
private schools and so on – invariably have the resources and the resolve to 
exercise a kind of ‘monopoly on the truth’ in situations where the child’s 
account of his or her lived experiences is not believed or taken seriously, or 
is ignored, or is suppressed or misrepresented, for at least as long as the 
                                                          
43 See Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, ‘Report of Case Study No 
11 etc.’ above n 24, p 32: ‘Mr Delaney gave evidence that in 1954, when Mr Delaney was 15 years old, 
Brother Parker admitted to Brother Doyle that he had been involved in sexual abuse at Bindoon. … 
Brother Doyle told Mr Delaney that he would be punished if he told anyone about it’. See also T Shaw 
(principal author and review leader) The Scottish Government, Historical Abuse Systemic Review: 
Residential Schools and Children’s Homes in Scotland 1950 to 1995 (2007) available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/11/20104729/27 (accessed 26 July 2017), 150: ‘A 
major theme among former residents’ experiences, as told to the review, is that they didn’t talk about 
their abuse as children or, if they did, they weren’t believed or they were punished. As children, they 
learned to be silent about what they experienced as grave injustices’. 
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child inhabits that environment.44 This may ensure that contemporaneous 
(third party) evidence of ongoing abuse is unavailable or unobtainable.45 
Legally, all of this creates a palpable anomaly. Not only have there often 
been evidential and practical barriers to the possibility of a child’s seeking 
civil law redress while still a child because, among other things, adult 
perpetrators of abuse, or the organisations to which they are connected, 
have often in the past presented to the outside world a false or sanitised 
version of the events complained of; but when, as adults, victims seek civil 
law redress for alleged violations of their childhood rights they may 
encounter similar evidential and practical barriers together with (in addition) 
the ‘guillotining’ effect of civil limitation laws. 
 
Thus, legally, the dice are more often than not loaded against children and 
against adults (as grown‐up victims of abuse in childhood) when attempting 
to redress, through the civil law, alleged violations of the right of the child to 
physical, sexual, emotional and psychological integrity. And this in turn not 
                                                          
44 As Lord Phillips comments in Catholic Child Welfare Society and others v The Institute of the Brothers 
of the Christian Schools, above n 37, at [92]: ‘Living cloistered on the school premises were vulnerable 
boys. They were triply vulnerable. They were vulnerable because they were children in a school; they 
were vulnerable because they were virtually prisoners in the school; and they were vulnerable 
because their personal histories made it even less likely that if they attempted to disclose what was 
happening to them they would be believed’. 
45 As one former resident of a children’s home in Scotland in the 1960s recounts: ‘The lines of reporting 
and communication appeared to deliberately obscure and threats of severe punishment were used 
by some carers to deter children from making complaints… There was no evidence that management, 
abusers and the system were accountable to anyone. They were skilful in concealing or suppressing 
incidents of malpractice, complaints of cruelty and reports of abuse‘. See T Shaw Historical Abuse 
Systemic Review, above n 43, p 141 (emphasis added). In the same report, at p 134, it is stated that: 
‘[m]any survivors … say that as children they often didn’t speak about their abuse or, if they did, they 
weren’t believed and were punished. Survivors also have reported that they weren’t able to talk about 
their abuse until they were older adults’. (Emphasis added.) On the difficulties of obtaining 
documentary evidence, see A Morrison ‘Author Alex Wheatle: 'Systematic abuse where I grew up' BBC 
News (London: 14 July 2014) available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk‐28295982 (accessed 26 July 
2017). 
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only reflects a kind of moral disequilibrium but in some way represents a 
symbolic reimposition of the harm caused by the original wrongdoing. In a 
sense the harm is reinforced when civil limitation laws and other obstacles 
to redress operate in effect to absolve the wrongdoer of civil liability. In 
some cases, it may be undeniable that deterioration of relevant evidence 
through the passage of time has placed parties to civil proceedings at a 
disadvantage requiring to be counterbalanced by the operation of civil 
limitation laws. But when the individuals and organisations in question, 
whether presently or in the past, have had unprecedented power over child 
abuse victims (including control and ownership of evidence such as records 
and files) the case for extending the balancing effect of civil limitation laws 
to such individuals and organisations seems less compelling. An obvious 
misuse of power – such as power targeted directly at children in the form of 
(for example) threats, punishment, discipline, isolation, physical restraint, 
emotional manipulation – as an explicit means to facilitate sexual 
exploitation or other abuses is not only inherently wrong and harmful, but 
the harm is validated and compounded in later life when, as adults, civil law 
claims are defeated through the successful invocation of civil limitation laws. 
Alleged wrongdoers may have not only acted deliberately, knowingly and 
exploitatively (and are to that extent the authors of their own ‘misfortune’, 
if civil law redress can be so perceived) but may have, presently or in the 
past, arranged their affairs very skilfully, including with the assistance of 
complicit organisations, to evade not only civil liability but moral 
responsibility for their wrongdoing. Plainly, perpetrators and complicit 
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organisations do not deserve the protection of civil limitation laws when 
they have in the past been uniquely placed to keep the truth – the evidence 
of abusive acts as they have unfolded in the victim’s childhood – tightly 
under control or subject to misrepresentation or distortion. In later life adult 
claimants may find – and the authority of the Brisbane case certainly 
reinforces the notion – that civil limitation laws and the rationale for such 
laws have conferred upon perpetrators a kind of retrospective ‘licence’ to 
have arranged their affairs in this way. So, in a perverse way, the law has 
conspired to make it ‘right’ (legally, if not morally) for perpetrators to have 
conducted their abusive activities in an atmosphere of secrecy, in some 
cases threatening victims with punishment if they report abuse. In relevant 
situations (where there is an institutional or organisational dimension to 
perpetrators’ wrongdoing – such as where they are employees or voluntary 
workers) individual perpetrators may be able to take advantage of an 
institutional or organisational culture of reputational protectionism.46 
Against that background, the idea that perpetrators and complicit 
organisations typically suffer from evidential disadvantage seems 
questionable. In the final analysis, civil limitation laws – justified, at least in 
part, on the basis of the freedom one is presumed to enjoy to arrange one’s 
                                                          
46 Integral to the perpetuation of such a culture in childhood abuse cases has been, in some cases, the 
development of ‘repertoires’ of techniques of covering‐up wrongdoing or impeding civil litigation – 
for example, maintenance of secret files (as we have seen in the case of the Archdiocese of Dublin); 
insistence on out‐of‐court settlements that include obtaining confidentiality undertakings from 
claimants; and misuse of diplomatic immunity to thwart investigations and legal proceedings that 
could cause reputational damage. See J Bingham ‘UN warns Vatican to hand over sex abuse files to 
police’ The Telegraph (London: 23 May 2014) available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/vaticancityandholysee/10852617/UN‐warns‐
Vatican‐to‐hand‐over‐sex‐abuse‐files‐to‐police.html (accessed 26 July 2017). 
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affairs to avoid legal liability – serve only to reinforce or supplement the 
artifice, deception and blocking measures (including legal stratagems) in 
some cases reportedly practised by perpetrators of child abuse and complicit 
organisations when they seek to escape civil law responsibility for 
wrongdoing. 
 
3.4 Rationale: public interest in speedy resolution of disputes 
 
The fourth rationale outlined by McHugh J in the Brisbane case is that it is in 
the public interest that disputes be settled as quickly as possible.47 On one 
hand this may be seen as a broader variant of the idea – already discussed 
above – that when a dispute is not settled speedily the likelihood of loss or 
deterioration of evidence may impact adversely upon quality of justice. 
However, the critical point of difference is the implied focus on the public 
interest in its own right. So, whilst engaging a public interest rationale 
envisages recognising the adverse effect on justice of delay, the implication 
is that the public interest transcends the narrower interests of individual 
disputants. Thus where dispute resolution can often be viewed as being in 
the interests of the few – notably, the immediate parties to a dispute – an 
assessment of the public interest shifts the emphasis, so that speedy dispute 
resolution is taken to be in the interests of the many – ie society as a whole. 
It can thus be taken to be in the interests of all that civil limitation laws act 
                                                          
47 Brisbane case, above n 6, p 553. Arguably a wider public interest rationale is implied. 
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either as an incentive to speedy dispute resolution (by imposing deadlines 
that compel prospective litigants to action), or as a mechanism that ensures 
that disputes are actually left unresolved through the barring – usually after 
a comparatively short period of time – of rights of action. So while civil 
limitation laws operate to incentivise speedy dispute resolution they also 
ensure that disputes remain unresolved (at any rate through litigation) by 
barring legal action in cases where for one reason or another disputes have 
not been speedily settled. 
 
It follows that the public interest rationale for such laws promotes the 
permanent non‐resolution of disputes as the lesser of two ‘evils’ when 
weighed against non‐speedy resolution of disputes. Thus the public interest 
rationale, as a rationale distinct from others, encourages the view that it is 
better that a dispute be left unresolved even after the passage of a relatively 
short period of time than that there should be an indefinite timescale for 
resolution. If this analysis is sound, it is not obvious why such a result should 
necessarily be in the public interest. As soon as more compelling 
justifications for civil limitation laws are disregarded in order to isolate public 
interest as a rationale in its own right, that rationale seems to have little 
merit. Giving primacy to speedy dispute resolution, with the attendant risk 
of permanent non‐resolution, has more than a few obvious drawbacks. For 
instance, a grievance or claim left permanently unresolved may engender 
simmering resentment in those who have been wronged but who, for any 
number of reasons, have simply failed to act swiftly enough to pursue civil 
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law redress. Likewise, the early barring (eg within three years, say) of a civil 
law right of action may instil the perception that justice has, with undue 
haste, been denied or betrayed, not only in the eyes of the wronged but 
more widely – indeed, publicly. A public sense of justice denied can hardly 
be in the interest of the public. 
 
If it is difficult – in the absence of more convincing justifications for civil 
limitation laws (some of which have already been considered) – to imagine 
where the public interest lies in generally maintaining the primacy of swift 
civil law redress over the permanent non‐resolution of civil disputes, it is 
arguably the more difficult in the particular context of wrongdoing involving 
allegations of historical childhood abuse. In that type of case there is an 
accumulation of evidence and informed opinion – academic, medical, 
psychiatric, psychological, juristic, anecdotal – that the practical difficulties 
and obstacles, including personal psychological inhibitions, faced by many 
victims in pursuing timely civil law redress can be insurmountable or endure 
for many years after the abuse.48 It is widely acknowledged that time is the 
enemy of such cases; whilst civil limitation laws operate in an especially 
acute way against the interests of abuse victims as a class of potential 
claimants, raising the question whether swift dispute resolution for its own 
sake is necessarily the most pressing issue relevant to a proper assessment 
                                                          
48 See texts cited above at n 11. As stated in a report from the Law Commission for England and Wales: 
‘Victims of such abuse frequently need time to recover sufficiently from the trauma consequent upon 
the abuse to be able to contemplate bringing a claim against their abusers’. See Law Commission for 
England and Wales Limitation of Actions, Report No 270 (2001), at [3.103]. 
 40 
of the public interest in claims centring on historical childhood abuse. The 
public interest in swift dispute resolution surely cannot outweigh the public 
interest in ensuring that, by means that are both criminal and civil, the law 
deters and punishes physical, emotional and sexual abuse of children while 
at the same time providing civil law restitution for victims for as long as it 
takes for victims to be in a position – psychologically and emotionally – to 
pursue appropriate forms of civil law redress.49 
 
4 Recent developments: two steps forward and one step back? 
 
Lately, in a number of jurisdictions, legislative initiatives have been pursued 
aimed at mitigating the effects of civil limitation laws in cases involving 
childhood abuse. For instance, almost all Canadian provinces and territories 
have abolished civil limitation laws so far as applicable to civil law claims 
alleging childhood abuse. Queensland, Australia has recently introduced 
legislation excluding civil limitation laws from applying in cases where 
childhood sexual abuse has occurred in an institutional setting.50 The 
                                                          
49 As the Law Commission for England and Wales has commented: ‘It could … be argued that the public 
interest in protecting the defendant from stale claims, and in ensuring that there is an end to litigation, 
does not apply where the defendant has been guilty of sexual abuse (which could be considered to 
make the case for exempting such claims from the long‐stop limitation period even stronger than is 
the case for other personal injury claims such as for asbestosis)’. See Law Commission for England and 
Wales Limitation of Actions, above n 48, at [3.103]. 
50 Limitation of Actions (Institutional Child Sexual Abuse) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2016. 
The expression ‘institution’ is defined as an entity that ‘provides … activities, facilities, programs or 
services of any kind that gives … an opportunity for a person to have contact with a child’. The Act is 
restricted to sexual abuse – so allegations relating solely to physical or emotional abuse or neglect 
would appear to be excluded. 
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Australian states of New South Wales51 and Victoria52 have also now enacted 
legislation disapplying civil limitation laws in childhood abuse cases though, 
unlike Queensland, in neither New South Wales nor Victoria is the 
disapplication of civil limitation laws restricted to childhood abuse occurring 
in an ‘institutional’ context. (Abuse occurring, say, between close family 
members would therefore fall within the statutory exemption.) But what is 
noteworthy is that in all three states the legislation specifically empowers 
the court to dismiss a case if the length of time taken by the claimant to 
initiate a civil law claim in respect of childhood abuse has a ‘burdensome 
effect on the defendant that is so serious that a fair trial is not possible’.53 
 
So far as English law is concerned, civil limitation laws in principle continue 
to apply to childhood abuse cases, albeit that the House of Lords case of A v 
Hoare54 and subsequent cases – taken in tandem with the discretion 
provided for in the Limitation Act 1980, s 33, to override the three‐year 
limitation period – have led to a measure of leniency in the judicial handling 
of childhood abuse cases when faced with the potential operation of 
limitation laws. Unlike other jurisdictions, no legislation has been introduced 
in England and Wales specifically disapplying civil limitation laws in 
                                                          
51 Limitation Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2016. The definition of ‘abuse’ is wider than in the case of 
Queensland’s 2016 Act, extending to sexual abuse and serious physical abuse. 
52 Limitation of Actions Amendment (Child Abuse) Act 2015. This Act extends to sexual abuse, physical 
abuse and psychological abuse. 
53 See the official statutory notes to the relevant provisions of each enactment. 
54 Above n 17. A v Hoare has opened the door to the use of the discretion in the Limitation Act 1980, 
s 33, to disapply civil limitation laws in cases involving deliberately inflicted injury where, prior to that, 
the case of Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498, HL(E) (which A v Hoare departs from) had erroneously 
laid down that the discretion was unavailable in such cases. Given that childhood abuse cases typically 
involve the deliberate infliction of harm or injury, the decision in A v Hoare has resulted in the 
increased use of the s 33 discretion in civil law claims centring on allegations of childhood abuse. 
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childhood abuse cases, though arguably the general approach of the courts 
during the last decade has at least served to lessen the impact of limitation 
laws in the context of civil law claims alleging childhood abuse. 
 
By contrast, in Scotland, a clear pattern of hardening of judicial attitude in 
favour of the strict enforcement of civil limitation laws in childhood abuse 
cases had been developing over more than a decade along with a seeming 
generalised judicial antipathy towards the substantive merits of claims in 
such cases.55 This appears to have been a precipitating factor in the decision 
of the Scottish Parliament to introduce legislation in 2017 disapplying 
limitation laws in civil actions in respect of personal injury resulting from 
alleged childhood abuse. Under the Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) 
Act 2017 civil limitation laws are disapplied across the board in the context 
of such actions: in other words, the exemption is not restricted to allegations 
of abuse occurring in institutional environments, though at an earlier point 
in the life of the legislation – at the consultation stage – that restriction was 
actively under consideration. Moreover, the expression ‘abuse’ is in some 
respects wider than in the corresponding legislation introduced in 
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, extending as it does to sexual 
abuse, physical abuse, emotional abuse and abuse in the form of neglect. 
                                                          
55 See E Russell ‘Denying the Discretion — A Trilogy of Cases’ (2013) Juridical Review 95 at 125–126: 
‘It seems difficult to resist the conclusion that a hardening of judicial approach is discernible in relation 
to the equitable discretion. The courts are increasingly focussing attention on the fundamental 
rationale of limitation statutes, namely that the rules serve the public interest, and that any 
derogation from the basic rule is exceptional and requires a compelling justification. In the absence 
of a compelling excuse on the pursuer’s part, it would appear that the rules of limitation will normally 
prevail’. 
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With the seemingly more moderate operation of civil limitation laws in 
England and Wales (established since A v Hoare) and the new legislative 
regime in Scotland it might have been thought that a rosier future awaits 
childhood abuse claimants under the civil law in the several jurisdictions of 
the UK. However, we must pause and reflect carefully upon developments 
in the recent past. Under English law there are regular reminders of an ever‐
present possibility of civil limitation laws being strictly applied, particularly 
in cases where judges have founded upon, or made reference to, the 
Brisbane case or to rationales paralleling those outlined in that case without 
necessarily engaging critically with those rationales so as to take account of 
the special position of historical childhood abuse claimants.56 In the absence 
of legislation disapplying civil limitation laws in childhood abuse cases in 
England and Wales the position for the foreseeable future is likely to 
continue to be dependent on the accident of whether an individual judge 
happens to adopt a lenient or strict approach to the case in hand or is, or is 
not, well disposed to the plight of those who have experienced childhood 
abuse.57 
 
In Scotland – despite the significant reform in this area introduced by the 
2017 Act – there is a real possibility that the law, going forward, could again 
                                                          
56 See cases cited above at n 17. 
57 See Richard Scorer ‘Time to take time’ New Law Journal (8 April 2016) available at 
https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/time‐take‐time (accessed 13 October 2017). Scorer calls 
for the introduction of appropriate legislation disapplying civil limitation laws in cases involving 
historical childhood abuse in England and Wales. 
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develop to a position where the handling of childhood abuse cases is 
attended by difficulties that were more than hinted at before the 
introduction of the Act. The particular difficulty – mirroring the position now 
established by statute in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria – arises 
from provisions of the 2017 Act that empower the court to have regard to 
the interests of the party sued (the defender) and to disallow a civil action 
from proceeding in relevant circumstances. In terms of the new s 17D(2) 
inserted into the primary enactment – ie the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973 – the court may disallow an action ‘where the defender 
satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place’. In 
addition, in terms of a new s 17D(3), the court may disallow an action if the 
defender satisfies the court that as a result of the disapplication of civil 
limitation laws ‘the defender would be substantially prejudiced were the 
action to proceed’ and ‘having had regard to the pursuer’s interest in the 
action proceeding, the court is satisfied that the prejudice is such that the 
action should not proceed’. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss ss 17D(2) and 17D(3) in any 
depth. Suffice it to say that whilst the ‘technical time bar’ – the literal, 
statutorily‐defined limitation period – may have been stripped away, a 
protective statutory regime (protective of the interests of the defender, that 
is) has been established which could prove to be as effective a barrier to the 
progress of a childhood abuse claim as the ‘numerical’ limitation period ever 
was. The key difficulty is that both provisions give primacy to the interests 
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of the defender and, while s 17D(3) requires the court to have regard ‘to the 
pursuer’s interest in the action proceeding’, the imperative to avoid 
prejudice to the defender appears to be the overriding concern of ss 17D(2) 
and 17D(3). The need for a fair hearing is already enshrined in principles of 
natural justice, human rights legislation and rules of evidence – extending to 
the requirement for sufficiency of evidence in all court proceedings, whether 
criminal or civil – so it is unclear why this has been given special emphasis in 
s 17D(2) (other than the obvious, which is as a focus for challenging a 
claimant’s civil action). The new statutory regime has in effect erected new, 
independent and powerful grounds of objection to the progress of a civil 
action centring upon allegations of childhood abuse.58 
 
Perhaps the most pressing concern attending the new statutory regime is 
that a ‘jurisprudence’ of ‘prejudice to the defender’ already exists in Scots 
law in the context of the use of civil limitation laws in childhood abuse 
cases;59 so when this is allied to the obvious persistence and persuasive force 
                                                          
58 See Scottish Human Rights Commission Consultation Submission to the Justice Committee of the 
Scottish Parliament: Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Bill (Edinburgh: January 2017) available 
at http://www.scottishhumanrights.com/policy‐publications/?page=5 (accessed 12 October 2017), 
para 6. The Commission, commenting on the Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Bill in its then 
form (early 2017), argues that the courts already have a duty under the Human Rights Act 1998 to 
interpret legislation in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. This guarantees, 
among other things, the right to a fair hearing. The Commission therefore questions the need for s 
17D(2). The Commission also draws attention to the fact that in terms of the established case law – 
when the exercise of the ‘section 19A discretion’ (see below n 59) has been under consideration – 
‘the court has placed great weight on the prejudice to the respondent and loss of evidence, 
particularly where the alleged abuser has subsequently died’. Furthermore, the Commission also 
expresses concern that ‘by making such a finding at a preliminary proof stage, survivors are denied 
the opportunity to present their case’. Overall, the Commission concludes that while the courts would 
be mindful of the intention of the (proposed) legislation to allow previously limited abuse cases to 
proceed it is nonetheless concerned that the ‘proposed section 17D could have the effect of 
undermining certainty and limiting the right to a remedy which lies at the heart of this legislation’. 
59 The idea of prejudice to the defender arises most often in the context of the so‐called ‘section 19A 
discretion’. Under the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, s 19A, the court has a 
discretionary power to allow an otherwise time‐barred action to proceed if it deems it ‘equitable’ to 
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of the Brisbane case, and its seeming uncritical endorsement in some judicial 
circles, the new statutory provisions – which do little to displace established 
case law – could be a charter for a reversion to the strictures of the recent 
past. The new provisions arguably offer too much discretion to a previously 
unsympathetic judiciary to fall back upon principles already established in 
case law to justify and explain civil limitation laws. Those principles – which 
include the rationales outlined in the Brisbane case, whose 
inappropriateness in the context of childhood abuse cases has been 
examined in some detail above – may now be given a new lease of life by a 
set of statutory provisions that represent a standing invitation for their 
revival, albeit in a newly established and independent context free of the 
‘numerical’ time‐bar but otherwise intact.60 
                                                          
do so. In civil law claims brought by adults in respect of allegations of historical childhood abuse the 
courts in Scotland have usually declined to exercise the discretion in favour of the claimant. See, for 
example, Whelan v Quarriers [2006] CSOH 159 and Godfrey v Quarriers [2006] CSOH 160. See also 
Russell, above n 55 and, generally, E Russell ‘Historic Abuse: The Hard Reality for Victims’ (2015) 
Juridical Review 53. In D v Murray [2012] CSOH 109, at [20] Lord Drummond Young links the notion of 
prejudice to the defender to the conventional rationales underlying limitation laws: ie fading 
memories, loss of records, unavailability of witnesses, and so on. In this and other cases – such as M 
v O’Neill, above n 7 – the impression is given that lapse of time is almost to be regarded as a 
peremptory reason for a finding of prejudice to the defender, without the necessity of interrogating 
the actual circumstances of the defender’s position: for instance, has the defender effected insurance 
cover as indemnity against just this eventuality; ignoring reputational damage, just how ‘prejudicial’ 
will paying monetary compensation to a claimant actually be to (an often wealthy) corporate 
defender; has documentary evidence been deliberately disposed of or concealed by the defender to 
undermine civil proceedings; has a particular organisation, faced with accusations, moved potential 
witnesses overseas; how plausible might a witness’s denial of events complained of be if weighed 
against a clear recollection of those events by a claimant (bearing in mind that it is actually in the 
interest of an abuser to deny any recollection of abuse given that the law favours the position of the 
party whose memory has allegedly faded)? 
60 There is, of course, the requirement for the court, under s 17D(3), to have regard to ‘the pursuer’s 
interest in the action proceeding’. But it should be noted that the idea of prejudice to the pursuer has 
been integral to the operation of the ‘section 19A discretion’ since the tests formulated by Lord Ross 
in Carson v Howard Doris Ltd 1981 SC 278, at 282. (This has not prevented attempts to rely on the 
‘section 19A discretion’ failing, more often than not, in historical childhood abuse claims.) In any 
event, it should be interesting to observe how restrictively the requirement to have regard to the 
pursuer’s interest will be interpreted by the courts in Scotland in balancing those interests against the 
interests of a defender considered to be ‘prejudiced’. Moreover, as the spirit and purpose of the new 
legislation have been clearly established, it may be that the courts will take the view that the fair 
hearing test (s 17D(2)) and defender prejudice test (s 17D(3)) represent significantly high hurdles for 
a defender to clear, bearing in mind that the onus will now be on the defender to satisfy the court in 
relation to the position in each case. Hitherto, the onus has been on the pursuer to establish the facts 
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5 Concluding reflections 
 
We have seen that the judicial quest for a proper context within which to 
consider rationales underlying civil limitation laws has often taken the 
opinion of McHugh J in the Brisbane case as its point of departure. In this 
article I have sought to explore the appropriateness of applying civil 
limitation laws to claims of adults arising from allegations of historical 
childhood abuse through an examination of the wider legal policy issues 
suggested by Justice McHugh’s opinion; and considering, in passing, issues 
of moral significance. However, it should be clear – even if the matter has 
not so far been put in such forthright terms – that for the particular reasons 
outlined in this article I take the view that civil limitation laws (and the 
rationales summarised in Justice McHugh’s opinion) are indeed largely 
inappropriate when applied to claims in historical childhood abuse cases. 
 
When society occasionally ordains that protections normally afforded by the 
civil law in the form of rights should be rendered unenforceable – such as by 
civil limitation laws – that would surely demand as compelling a moral and 
                                                          
and circumstances relevant to the operation of the ‘section 19A discretion’: see Nimmo v British 
Railways Board 1999 SLT 778, at 783; and AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth 2008 SC (HL) 146, at [25] (Lord 
Hope of Craighead). See also – for burden of proof, when laid upon the claimant under English Law – 
A Burrows ‘Some Recurring Issues in Relation to Limitation of Actions’ in A Dyson, J Goudkamp and F 
Wilmot‐Smith (eds) Defences in Tort (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015). In the future Scots law potentially 
has much to learn from the approach of the English judiciary to the exercise of the discretion under 
the Limitation Act 1980, s 33, in childhood abuse cases who, since A v Hoare, appear genuinely to have 
sought to strike a fair balance between the respective interests of claimant and defendant: see B and 
others v Nugent Care Society; R v Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council [2010] 1 WLR 516, especially 
at [20–27] (Lord Clarke of Stone‐cum‐Ebony MR). 
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policy rationale as any reason there might be for ensuring that the relevant 
protections and rights remained fully enforceable. What has been 
maintained in the course of the preceding discussion is that, in historical 
childhood abuse cases, civil limitation laws tend to give primacy to the 
interests of alleged wrongdoers (or organisations that have sheltered them 
or perpetuated their alleged wrongdoing) and to the need to protect them 
from civil law redress in a context in which the ordinary justification for such 
laws is weak when weighed (among other things) against the enormity of 
the injury caused by the abuses complained of and the unique and acute 
difficulties victims have often faced in pursuing timely enforcement action 
in respect of the childhood rights allegedly violated. Alleged wrongdoers, or 
institutions or organisations with which alleged wrongdoers have been 
closely connected, have in the past reportedly gone to exceptional lengths 
to shield themselves from civil law redress – for instance, often exercising an 
extraordinary measure of control over victims in childhood (and sometimes 
in adulthood); controlling the availability of documentary and other 
evidence; denying and covering‐up possible crimes and other wrongdoing; 
employing superior financial resources to mount legal challenges; and 
generally doing everything in their power to circumvent civil liability.61 The 
notion that alleged wrongdoers should be protected by law from the civil 
                                                          
61 For a critique touching (among other things) on a historical political programme aimed at removing 
Australian Aboriginal children from their families in order to ‘assimilate’ them with the ‘European 
mainstream’ see Honni van Rijswijk ‘Stories of the Nation’s Continuing Past: Responsibility for 
Historical Injuries in Australian Law and Alexis Wright’s Carpentaria’ (2012) 35 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 598. Fascinating and relevant as the wider debate highlighted by van Rijswijk may 
be – including its implications for a broader critical frame of reference focusing on childhood abuse – 
it is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article to engage more fully with that debate. 
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law consequences of knowingly inflicted wrongdoing is incomprehensible. 
Recent developments in Scots law, and Parliament’s failure (to date) to 
intervene legislatively in English law, have succeeded only in heightening 
legal uncertainty as to the operation, in the context of historical childhood 
abuse claims, of both civil limitation laws ‘proper’ and new prejudice‐based 
statutory grounds of objection to such claims (eg under Scots law and in 
Australian jurisdictions). 
 
When an alleged wrongdoer is given immunity from civil law redress, in a 
civil action founded on allegations of historical childhood abuse, victims of 
such abuse are denied the symbolic power of a public affirmation of the 
wrong done to them. Such an affirmation could operate at least to mitigate 
the ongoing harmful effects of the original wrongdoing. It might assist 
closure and healing for victims towards redressing the harm occasioned by 
the abuse.62 The use of civil limitation or related laws conferring immunity 
exacerbates the harm caused by the wrongdoing not only by seemingly 
denying civil justice but (in so doing) by promoting the interests of alleged 
wrongdoers over the interests of the allegedly wronged, or at least treating 
them as on the same footing, despite the fact that one may have committed 
deliberate wrongdoing (or, in the case of an organisation, may have been 
complicit in, or perpetuated such wrongdoing) against the other in 
                                                          
62 This is, of course, to say nothing of the availability of, and the question of pursuing, compensation 
for injury, pure and simple. On that subject, see generally P Case Compensating Child Abuse in England 
and Wales (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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circumstances where, as we have seen, the dice are so often loaded against 
the individual allegedly wronged. 
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